6 147 these were not used; if a tool was used, what facilitated its use and the extent to which the 148 tool informed the decision process. The script included prompts related to the factors that the 149 expert working group identified as potential barriers or catalysts to the uptake of decisions 150 tools. The questions were open ended to allow discussion, expression of personal views, and 151 for new themes to emerge. This allowed for the identification of additional factors that 152 influenced the use or non-use of DSTs, other than those anticipated from the literature. As 153 these themes were not defined prior to conducting each interview, they were not raised with 154 every interviewee. The interviews were conducted in accordance with The University of 155 Western Australia's Human Research Ethics procedures (#RA/4/1/6302).
2.4 Analysis
157 A qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts was performed to evaluate the role that each 158 factor played in facilitating uptake of the specific decision tool available for each policy.
159 Specifically, we applied the categories "not important", "somewhat important" and 160 "important" to identify how the interviewees perceived the influence of each factor. In 161 addition to these assessments, we also provide quotes from the interviews to illustrate the 162 findings across the case studies.
3. Results
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The importance of each of the eight factors that facilitate usage of DSTs varied for each of 165 the seven case study policies (Table 2) . For example, for the South West Marine Reserve 166 Network (SWMRN), the interviewees perceived that uptake of the relevant DST (Marxan) 167 was Low. The facilitating factor "Tool is able to deal with missing information" was seen as 168 Important by the interviewees, and as not being met by the DST. On the other hand, in the 169 Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF) interviewees perceived that the 170 uptake of the DST (the Harvest Strategy Framework) was High. Based on the interviewee's 171 responses, the facilitating factor "Existence of a relationship between agency staff and tool 172 experts" was judged as Important, meaning that this factor facilitated uptake of the DST. Table 2 here] 174 The two policy challenges which had highest identified use of DSTs (SESSF and the 175 Representative Areas Program (RAP)) recognised almost all of the factors as being 7 177 Overall, across all policy problems, the most important factor was "Tool capabilities align 178 with policy objectives" (rated as important in six out of seven policies), with "Tool is able to 179 deal with missing information" being rated next most highly (rated as important in five out of 180 seven policies). 181 3.1 How well the tool capabilities align with the policy objectives 182 The need for the policy objectives and tool capabilities to align was considered an important 183 factor in tool uptake in six out of the seven policy cases. For the policies where there was a 184 perceived match between the decision tool and policy objectives (e.g., the SESSF and 185 Representative Areas Program (RAP)), interviewees noted that the advantages of using the 186 tool included the ability to set quantitative and transparent targets.
[insert
187 There were a few examples where the policy objectives did not match the decision tool. In 188 the case of the SWMRN, there was a perceived mismatch between the decision tool, Marxan, 189 and the policy objectives, which contributed to the low uptake of Marxan in the policy 190 process. The Draft Management Plan for the network states that the reserves were,
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"proclaimed for the purpose of protecting and maintaining marine biodiversity, while Zealand case, the format of the data required was thought to assist the tool's application. In 246 the Australian case, the format required did not match the way in which data were collected 247 for the legislated species recovery plans, and there would be costs of employee time involved 248 in reformatting. The latter case was reported to have contributed to the lack of uptake of the 249 decision tool in the Australian Government policy process. 260 One interviewee for this policy noted that the relationship between agency staff and the 261 CSIRO tool expert was instrumental in its successful uptake by the agency.
262 It was noted by one interviewee that there are several layers of bureaucracy within the 263 relevant agency, making it difficult for advice to reach the level at which decisions are 264 actually made. This may suggest that having within-agency tool experts to act as 265 "champions" would be beneficial for DST uptake. However, this suggestion did not resonate 266 with many of our interviewees, apparently because such champions are only perceived to be 267 influential if they are at a high-enough level in the bureaucracy. Similarly, they tended not to 268 rate highly the role of external tool experts as "advocates", in part because it was felt that 269 they may not be sufficiently aware of internal needs. Other writers have argued that an 270 internal champion can facilitate DST uptake (e.g. Jacobs 2002; Pannell and Roberts 2009), 271 but it seems that they were not critical in these case studies.
272 3.4 Presence of large numbers of stakeholder groups affected by the outcome 273 The results for "Presence of large numbers of stakeholder groups affected by the outcome" 274 were polarised, being suggested as important in three policy cases, not important in three and 275 not applicable in one (Table 2) .
276 It can be difficult to engage multiple stakeholders in a timely and effective manner. The 277 information obtained from the interviews suggests that, for two authorities (the Great Barrier 278 Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) and AFMA), using the decision tool to demonstrate 279 outcomes from different policy designs facilitated the stakeholder-engagement progress.
280 Boundary setting and removing ambiguity were noted as particularly valuable capabilities. 308 The length of time permitted for the policy process affected tool uptake inconsistently, even 309 though all of the policies studied were developed over reasonably long timeframes (relative 310 to some policies). For the SESSF, RAP, and New Zealand Threatened Species Protection, 311 there were lengthy processes in overhauling the policies. There was plenty of time available 312 to create or select, apply and interpret outputs from an appropriate tool. In the case of the 313 SESSF, the policy process also provided time to develop and adapt the decision tool. This is 314 because fishery management is an ongoing adaptive process, rather than a one-off decision, 315 so the decision tool itself can be adapted over time. Nevertheless, there are sometimes 316 "windows of opportunity" to institute major changes, and this occurred with the SESSF 317 harvest strategy in 2005. For the New Zealand Threatened Species Protection policy, the 318 interviewee noted that having ample time was also important to permit staff consultation and 319 adoption of the DST.
320 The SWMRN, also involved a lengthy policy process; however, this was not perceived to be 321 an important factor in relation to tool uptake, perhaps because the tool was already not 322 considered to be highly suitable to the task, for other reasons. On the other hand, the time 323 needed to apply the tool was considered to be an important inhibiting factor in the use of 12 325 on the available time). This is in contrast to the RAP, where application time for the same 326 DST was not considered to be an important factor influencing uptake.
327 For the NRS, time was an important factor in contributing to the lack of use of the decision 328 tool, Marxan. The interviewee noted that there was a tradeoff between having more complete 329 information, as would be provided by a Marxan analysis, and efficient use of time. In their 330 opinion, sufficient information to make adequate decisions could be provided by a short set 331 of questions that could be applied much more quickly than using a DST. In this policy 332 context, application of the DST was considered to be a waste of resources. 342 not necessarily follow that 'equity' should be explicitly included in the DSTs. It may be 343 sufficient for decision makers to make subjective post hoc adjustments. The appropriate 344 handling of equity in decision tools is an issue that may justify additional investigation.
345 The second factor is that DSTs were more likely to be used and viewed favourably by the 346 relatively autonomous agencies (i.e. the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and 347 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority) compared with the national agency. Interviewees 348 from these agencies also commented that they have used other DSTs for policy making. 
Representative Areas Program (RAP)
In the mid-1990s concerns were raised that the system of zoning at the time were inadequate to protect the range of biodiversity that existed in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.
Between 1999 
National Reserve System (NRS)
The NRS has its origins in the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, $11.5 million was spent on the National Reserve System Cooperative Program. By 1996, the Program consisted of more than 5,600 properties covering almost 60 million hectares. Australia's EPBC Act and assessed how well the nation's 9000 plus reserves (covering 11.6% of Australia) protects these species. They found over 80% of the species analysed were inadequately protected. Using Marxan, they devised a reserve system that protected target numbers of threatened species for the least cost.
Threatened Species Protection -Commonwealth and State Government
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 focuses Australian Government interests on the protection of matters of national environmental significance.
Each state and territory has responsibility for matters of state and local significance, meaning there is often some cross over in species listings. The Act is a means for identification and listing of species and ecological communities as threatened; development of conservation advice and recovery plans for listed species and ecological communities; development of a register of critical habitat; recognition of key threatening processes; and where appropriate, reducing the impacts of these processes through threat abatement plans.
Threatened Species Protection -New Zealand
The 
